Read the organization (API key)
The calling organization's own profile and settings. Shared, and this is the operation that makes the rest of the surface navigable: businessType here is how a program learns which engine it is talking to, and therefore which of the two sets of endpoints below apply to it. Guarding it to one vertical would make that undiscoverable.
A singleton, so the envelope is { data: { … } } with an object and there is no nextCursor, no limit and no cursor. One envelope, always data, so a caller unwraps every v1 response the same way.
timezone is the org's own IANA zone, and it is what the wall-clock times on GET /api/v1/service-periods are expressed in and what startsAt/endsAt on the two booking lists are expressed in too. A program reading bookings needs this endpoint to interpret them correctly, so a key granted only appointments:read or reservations:read cannot resolve them; grant organization:read alongside. See the timestamps section of docs/api-keys.md. currency and the deposit* fields are what a program needs to quote a deposit without guessing.
There is deliberately no organization:write scope to pair with this. Migration 0022 exists because a tenant could edit its own slug, status and business_type outside the app; handing that back to a long-lived program-held credential would undo it. solvintia_client_id is withheld: it links this org to a record in a different Solvintia product and means nothing here.
Authorization
bearerApiKey organization:readThe scheme for programmatic callers: partner integrations, a customer's own scripts, the planned
skill and MCP server. Accepted by the /api/v1/* operations and by nothing else; the rest of this
document is session-cookie only. Every :read scope below has a GET /api/v1/<resource> behind it, and
a static check fails the build if a scope is added without one. Full detail lives in docs/api-keys.md; the load-bearing
parts are:
- Transport.
Authorization: Bearer sk_live_…only. No query parameter, no custom header, no cookie fallback: a credential in a URL ends up in access logs, referrers and browser history. - A key is a program with scopes, not a human with a role. It carries no
admin/staffrole at all; scopes are the entire authorization model, and an admin issuing a key is deliberately delegating their own authority. - Scopes are
resource:action, where resource is exactly the/api/<resource>folder name and action isreadorwrite.writedoes NOT implyread: they are compared by exact string. - The engine boundary is enforced twice. Engine scopes are filtered at issuance against the org's
own
business_type(an appointments org cannot be grantedreservations:*), and again at use time by the gate's vertical argument.wrong_verticalis its own 403 code. - There is no scope for key management. A key can never mint, list or revoke another key, so a
leaked key cannot be used to establish persistence.
organizationis read-only for the same reason migration 0022 exists. - Errors carry a machine-readable
codealongsideerror:missing_authorization,invalid_key,key_revoked,key_expired,organization_inactive(all 401);insufficient_scope,wrong_vertical,plan_required(403);rate_limited(429). Match oncode, never on the sentence. Note this is a RICHER error body than the{error}every session-authenticated route in this document returns. - Rate limiting is per key, a fixed 60-second window defaulting to 120 requests/minute, with
Retry-AfterandX-RateLimit-*headers on a 429. Session-authenticated routes have no rate limiting in application code, deliberately: the rest of the app is covered at the edge by a Vercel WAF rate-limit rule, which is not billed for what it blocks and never reaches a function. Seedocs/api-keys.md. - One envelope, one paging scheme. Every list answers
{ data: [...], nextCursor }; the singleton answers{ data: {...} }.nextCursoris keyset (seek) paging, opaque, and null exactly when there are no more rows. Every field is camelCase, unlike the database columns underneath. /api/v1/is a real version segment, not decoration. There is nov2yet. When one ships,v1keeps answering unchanged for a notice window of at least 6 months, and everyv1response carriesDeprecationandSunsetheaders (RFC 9745, RFC 8594) for that whole window. Only a security fix can shorten it. Seedocs/api-keys.md.
In: header
Scope: organization:read
Response Body
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
application/json
curl -X GET "https://example.com/api/v1/organization"{ "data": { "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08", "name": "string", "slug": "string", "industry": "string", "status": "string", "timezone": "string", "businessType": "appointments", "tagline": "string", "currency": "string", "logoUrl": "string", "backgroundImageUrl": "string", "accentColor": "string", "bookingTheme": "string", "bookingThemeToggleEnabled": true, "notifyEmailEnabled": true, "notifySmsEnabled": true, "depositEnabled": true, "depositType": "fixed", "depositAmountCents": 0, "depositPercentage": 0, "depositPerPerson": true, "depositMinPartySize": 0, "depositRefundWindowHours": 0, "guestManageEnabled": true, "guestManageCutoffHours": 0, "createdAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z" }}List clients (API key) GET
The client/guest directory, for a program. **Shared by both engines** and gated with no vertical for that reason: a client record means the same thing to a salon and a restaurant, which is why the dashboard screen behind it is one shared route too. There is consequently no `wrong_vertical` failure here. Read-only, like every `/api/v1` operation. As above, the handler's explicit `company_id` filter is the entire tenant boundary: removing it would leak every organization's client list. Ordered newest first. No date filters: a client directory is not time-shaped, and there is no search parameter either, deliberately: a `?q=` would be a third `.or()` call site to sanitize and pagination already lets a caller walk the whole list.
Send product feedback (bug report, idea, or general) to Solvintia POST
Reached from NavUser's account menu, present for every signed-in dashboard login regardless of role or vertical: deliberately NOT the guest post-booking review at /api/feedback/{token} above, a different route on a different table for a different audience. Written through the caller's own RLS-scoped client, not service-role: book_feedback_submissions' `tenant_insert_own` policy (migration 0182) already enforces `company_id` and `user_id` both matching the JWT, so this route trusts the database rather than re-checking what it already checks. On success, also fires a best-effort alert email to `ALERT_EMAIL || NOTIFICATIONS_FROM_EMAIL` (the same operator address /api/cron/queue-health alerts to), synchronously rather than through book_job_queue: this is low-volume internal alerting, not a customer-facing send that needs retry resilience. A Resend failure here never turns a successful submission into an error response; the row is already saved. Private inbox by design: nothing this route returns, and nothing /superadmin/feedback shows, is ever surfaced back to the submitter beyond the 200 itself.