Shared

Send a campaign for real (admin, or manage_org_settings)

post/api/marketing/campaigns/{id}/send

Re-checks every client-side checklist item server-side: never trust the client gate alone. Order matters: (1) validate and compute the audience READ-ONLY, (2) flip draft -> sending ATOMICALLY (.eq('status','draft') is what makes a double-click or a retry produce a 409 instead of a second materialization), (3) materialize book_campaign_recipients in 200-row chunks, (4) enqueue the first campaign_chunk job. If step 4's enqueue fails the response is still 200 with a warning field; the campaigns list route's own read self-heals a stuck send by re-enqueueing, the same "swept when somebody reads the job list" idiom flagStalledJobs already establishes for data jobs.

Authorization

sessionCookie
sb-qxrvgfkjyvbngipqvslu-auth-token<token>

The dashboard's Supabase Auth session cookie, set at sign-in. Large sessions are split across numbered chunks (…auth-token.0, .1), so treat this as a cookie family rather than one name.

Every request re-validates it against the Auth server (getUser()), never by decoding the cookie locally: a JWT nothing has checked is not a credential. Tenancy is then read from the verified app_metadata.company_id claim and enforced by row-level security; it is never read from request input, on any route, ever.

role (admin / staff) is deliberately not in RLS. It gates specific actions in route code, the operations marked admin below, so hiding a button in the UI is cosmetic only, and a route's own check is the enforcement.

In: cookie

Path Parameters

id*string

Campaign id.

Response Body

application/json

application/json

application/json

application/json

application/json

application/json

application/json

application/json

curl -X POST "https://example.com/api/marketing/campaigns/string/send"
{  "ok": true,  "reach": 0,  "warning": "string"}